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A Social Sketch of Radical Islamism in Solo  
Abstrak/Abstract 
This article examines phenomena of Islamic radicalism in Solo based on the 
social facts in the city. The assessment is important in tracing the origins of Islamic 
radicalism in Solo recently. By bibliographical study of Islamic movement and field 
study in the region, this study describes and analyzes the formats of Islamic radicalism 
in Solo and its impacts in political situation in Indonesia. This comprehension on the 
emergence of this radicalism, according to the writer, could bring to the solving of the 
problems and the prevention of surfacing Islamic radicalism in the future. 
 
Artikel ini mengkaji gejala radikalisme Islam di Solo berdasarkan pada fakta-
fakta sosial di kota tersebut. Pembahasan ini penting bagi melihat asal-usul 
radikalisme Islam di Solo pada gejala akhir-akhir ini. Dengan studi literatur dan 
lapangan, kajian ini mendeskripsikan dan menganalisis apa yang menjadi formasi 
radikalisme Islam di Solo dan dampaknya pada situasi politik di Indonesia. 
Pemahaman tentang kemunculan radikalisme ini, menurut penulis, dapat 
mengantarkan pada pemecahan masalah dan pencegahan timbulnya radikalisme 
Islam di kemudian hari. 
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A. Introduction 
Radical Islamism in Solo is part of 
social radicalism of the Solonese in 
general. Therefore, the problem of 
radical Islamism in the region as the 
focus of my study here is not merely 
problem of Muslims nor Islam as a 
religion as such. Rather, it is the problem 
of the Solonese in general. The real 
problem is lying beneath the social 
structure of the Solonese since it has to 
do more with their social history, culture, 
and politics. As Olivier Roy has noted 
that despite the trans-national factors, 
some national peculiarities also play a 
significant role in shaping the resurgence 
of Islamism.1 In other words, cultural, 
                                                 
1 Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: the search for a new 
ummah, Hurst & Company, London, 2004, p. 62.  
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social, and political deprivation on the 
local and national levels have been 
supported by the mainstreaming process 
of modernization and globalization in 
the global context. 
Indeed, all radical Islamism in 
Solo do not have to do with Islam as a 
corpus of religion. Likewise, radical 
Islamism has nothing to do with the 
doctrines or dogmas of Islam. Rather, it 
has to do more with how Muslims 
interpret doctrines within Islam on this 
current situation. There were cultural, 
social, and political problems which have 
shaped their attitude and behaviour. On 
the national level, all Indonesians have 
undergone almost the same treatment of 
the state. The hegemony of the state, the 
issue of corruption, and the authoritarian 
government are commonly felt by any 
Muslims even Indonesians in general. In 
other words, political grievances are not 
enough tension to produce such 
radicalism. In the same way, other 
similar characteristics may also be found 
at other cities, but they do not breed 
radical Islamism. But, why such radical 
Islamism is not becoming a phenomenon 
in other cities as it is in Solo. It should be 
noted here, therefore, that there are some 
peculiarities of Solo or the Solonese 
which gave the rise to this radical 
Islamism. Therefore, beside political 
factors, I tend also to focus on other 
characteristics such as social culture of 
the society. On this phase, culture and 
politics must be examined to more fully 
understand how radical Islamism is 
prolific in the region. 
To comprehend this cultural 
phenomenon, Bourdieu’s perspective of 
habitus may assist me in viewing the 
practice of radicalism among the 
Solonese. For him, the attitude and 
behaviour of people could not be 
detached from social structure in which 
they live. The approach which could also 
be called as genetic structuralism views 
that mental structure of a person in a 
community is a result of social structure 
of the community. By employing this 
approach, theories of social production 
and the logic attitude of person in a 
community could be established. The 
theory of habitus argues that an attitude 
and behaviour of a person in society is 
shaped unconsciously by common 
behaviour of people in the community. 
People within the community just take 
these attitude and behaviour for granted 
(Haryatmoko, 2003: 8). In the context of 
Solo, social and political deprivation is a 
habitus, while historically the Solonese 
are abangan is the capital, and finally 
politics which sometime triggers the 
emergence of ‘practice’ (radicalism) is 
the field in this approach. 
Along with the rise of radical 
Islamism in Indonesia, Islamism is also 
the phenomenon of the current world 
even at most developed countries. As 
many scholars argue, radical Islamism is 
one of the products of the globalizing 
mainstream of modernization. Modern 
technology has shrunk the world into a 
global village. The rapid growth of 
information and technology have 
marginalized the role of religion in 
society. For fundamentalists or 
Islamisists, modernization is an immense 
threat to Muslims since it is not only a 
concept but it is a social process which 
produces social products. Traditional 
Islamic values are marginalized, swept 
away, and even replaced by Western 
values. Conventional Islamic preaching 
no longer could restrain the influence of 
modernization from the West. Among 
the influence of modernization and 
globalization is the spread of secularism 
as a part of gazwul fikri (the war of 
ideology). The inability of some 
Muslims’ groups to follow the beat of 
modernity has given rise to such Islamic 
revivalist groups as a way to counter to 
modernization. The demand of sharī‘ah 
in many Muslim countries is one of the 
ways Muslims counter Western’s 
modernization. However, the encounter 
with modernization and globalization is 
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also accompanied by the sentiment of 
anti-Westernism. The hegemonic power 
of some Western countries toward 
Muslim countries to some extent have 
also heightened the situation. The 
emergence of Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI) may 
be one of the examples of such resistance 
movement. 
 
B. Social Facts Regarding Islam in Solo 
1. Diverse ethnics: the failed 
indigenization 
Solo is characterized by its plural society 
since the beginning of its existence in the 
18th century. There are many ethnics 
living in Solo such as Javanese, Arabs, 
and Chinese.2 Similar to some other 
plural cities in Indonesia, ethnicity has 
become a sensitive issue. However, since 
different ethnicity is also followed by 
different religions, cultures, and 
identities, the plurality Solonese has been 
heightened by those diverse identities. In 
fact, the Javanese are the majority of all 
ethnics living in the region. The 
insignificant numbers of other ethnics 
should not bring about social problems 
for the Solonese. However, due to the 
economic successful of several ethnics 
over the majority, it led to such kind of 
social tension. With the exception of the 
Chinese,3 almost all ethnics share many 
things in common especially in terms of 
their religion, which is mostly Islam. The 
different religion and other cultural 
identities which finally make difficult for 
                                                 
2 In fact, there are many other ethnics in the city, 
i.e. Sundanese, Banjarese, Maduranese, Minang 
and Batak. However, since their number is not 
quite significant, their existence is not quite 
significant in Solo in many senses. 
3 Although the name of Chinese is the most 
common term used to identify the Chinese 
descendants in Southeast Asian countries, its 
translation in Indonesia (Cina) and Javanese Cino 
is not common in Indonesia. Since both terms 
have some negative connotations, Indonesian 
Chinese prefer to be called as Tionghoa 
(Zhonghua). In this thesis, however, I will use the 
term Chinese with its neutral connotations. 
the Chinese to integrate into the majority 
community. Religion and economic 
differences between the Chinese and the 
Javanese as majority led to such kind of 
social disparities among them. For this 
reasons, I will explore the ethnics of 
Arabs and Chinese in terms of their 
striving to survive and to submerge 
within the majority of the Javanese. 
 Although Arabs do not comprise 
1% of the population, the existence of 
this ethnic is quite significant in Solo in 
many senses. Since its presence in the 
region, they have been residing in the 
Pasar Kliwon sub-district, at the Eastern 
side of the Kasunanan kingdom. It was 
part of the politics of Dutch government 
to locate this ethnic and separated it with 
indigenous Muslims.4 Although there 
were many Arabs living in other sub-
districts of Solo, Pasar Kliwon has been 
the major Arab community in the region. 
Business has become the skill of Arabs 
since their coming to the archipelago. In 
the Solo context, the privilege of Arabs 
from the royal kingdom gave them many 
chances in businesses especially 
middleman trade, money lending, and 
landownership (Mandal, 1994: 42).5 The 
success of Arabs in business is supported 
                                                 
4 Dutch government wanted to reduce the 
influence of pure Islam and the idea of Pan-
Islamism of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghani from the 
Middle East in Indonesia by limiting the 
immigration of Arabs to Indonesia, banning the 
assimilation of Arabs in Indonesia, and 
discriminating Arabs in Indonesia. In Dutch’s 
view, Islam is identical with Arabs. Therefore, 
based on Snouck Hurgronje’s advises, Dutch 
government launched some regulations on Arabs 
in the country. Further see Hamid Al-Gadri, 
Politik Belanda terhadap Islam dan keturunan Arab di 
Indonesia, CV Masagung, Jakarta, 1988, pp. 58, 85, 
146.  
5 Since the early of 1900s, most Arabs in the 
archipelago were engaged in the intermediary 
trade while others profited from the cultivation of 
crops, the construction and rental properties, and 
batik industry. Further, see Sumit Mandal, Finding 
their place: a history of Arabs in Java under Dutch 
rule, 1800-1924. PhD thesis at Columbia 
University, 1994, p. 52.  
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by the facts that this community has 
good networks across the country. 
Although initially the Arabs had 
problem in term of their assimilation 
with the indigenous people, since the 
early of the 20th century and the 
involvement of some Arabs in the 
struggle for Indonesia independence, the 
problems has been settled (Ibid: vii). 
Along with any other Arabs all over 
Indonesia, Arabs in Solo are Yemeni-
descendant firstly coming to Indonesia in 
the 13th century. Similar to any other 
Arab communities, however, Arab 
community in Solo is characterised 
sharply by the Sayyid and non-Sayyid or 
‘Alawy and Irshady.6 In the context of 
Solo, however, both groups seems 
developed each own activities within the 
region.  
 Owing to their religious 
similarity, the relationship between 
Arabs and the Javanese goes well. 
Although they have different culture, the 
Arabs could easily submerge into the 
Javan Solonese. Van den Berg underlined 
that the Arabs’ acculturation was also 
supported by the fact that most Arabs 
men at first married with Javanese 
women.7 Nowadays, however, most 
                                                 
6 Sayyid or well known as ‘alawy or ‘alawiyyin or 
Habāib is those having direct link to the prophet 
Muhammad through his grand-son Hussein. The 
word ‘alawy is taken from Hussein’s descendant 
Habīb ‘Alwi bin Ubaidillah bin Ahmad Al-
Muhajir who lived in Hadramawt, the south of 
Yemeni.  While non-Sayyid are just common Arabs 
who do not have any link to the prophet. Prior to 
the independence of Indonesia, the first group are 
those united in Jami‘at al-Khair (charitable 
association). It was the Sudanese Achmad 
Soorkati (1872-1943) who was disagree with this 
distinction and finally established Jam‘iyyah al-
Ishlāh wa al-Irshad al-Islamiyah or well know as Al-
Irshād in 1913. 
7 According to van den Berg, only few Arab-born 
women stayed for long period in Indonesia. That 
is among the reason why most Arabs married 
with Indonesian women. Most Arabs in Indonesia 
the 20th century were born in Indonesia. The 
existence of sayyid as the descendants of Prophet 
Muhammad is among the exception. See L.W.C. 
van den Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di 
Arabs descendants do not marry with 
other ethnics especially Arab women. 
Interestingly enough, although not all 
Arabs know a lot about Islam, most 
Javanese consider them as having higher 
degree in terms of their religiosity.8 
Undeniably, therefore, that some Arabs 
become religious scholar. I want to 
underline here that being Arab is 
blessing among the Javanese although 
only a few of them could speak Arabic. 
Nevertheless, I would assert that only a 
few Arabs in the region involved much 
in proselytizing of Islam. One significant 
phenomenon to support my argument is 
that the most Javanese living in the 
neighbourhood of Arabs are still abangan. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the villages in 
the sub-district of Pasar Kliwon has been 
among heavily abangan communities in 
Solo. 
 On the religious role of Arabs 
among the Javanese, it is necessary to 
assert here the existence of Habīb ‘Ali bin 
Muhammad bin Hussein Al-Habsy in 
Solo. Although he died about 95 years 
ago, thousands Arabs and Javanese 
coming from many different regions 
across the country appear at the mosque 
of Riyadh at Pasar Kliwon annually on 
20th Rabi‘ al-Awwal to commemorate his 
death (haul). Habīb ‘Ali is well known for 
his efforts to do dakwah during his life, 
especially to the poor. The figure also 
well known of its poetic prose of the 
prophet’s history namely, Simtu al-Durār 
(necklace of pearls). The attendants 
which could reach as many as 50,000 
recite the prose, sway to and fro as if in 
                                                                    
Nusantara, INIS, Jakarta, 1989 (the original book 
was in Dutch and published in 1887). 
8 Van den Berg also argued that it was mistaken to 
believe that most Arabs master in Islamic 
theology. Rather, he stated that only a few Arabs 
are good in Arabics as well as in Islam, even more 
to be a teacher on Islam. In fact, some Javanese 
‘ulama also dislike Arabs since there were such 
belief among Javanese that indigenous ‘ulama 
could be consider as ‘a half Arab’. Further see, 
L.W.C. van den Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni, p. 
103-104. 
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the spiritual ecstasy. The spiritual 
gatherings of Habīb ‘Ali are well known 
to be so spiritually surcharged that they 
draw many non-Muslims to Islam. Most 
Javanese Muslims come to the gathering 
are poor people coming from many 
suburb areas across the Central Java and 
hoping that they would get barakah 
(blessing) from Habīb ‘Ali. 
 The talent of Arabs to run a 
business also support their acculturation 
with the indigenous Javanese. Initially, 
the Pasar Kliwon village was such kind 
of an enclave  of Arabs. However, their 
expertise in business have attracted more 
people to cooperate with or work for 
them which finally led the village 
became such kind of plural community. 
Batik and clothes trading which was 
initially run by Javanese has been 
surpassed by the Arabs. The necessity of 
Arabs to expand their network of 
business has given rise to the necessity of 
more workers which mostly done by the 
Javanese. Such patron-client relationship 
made more possibilities for Arabs to be 
accepted well among the Javanese.  
 
Figure 1: Ethnic Population in Solo 
No. Ethnics 
Num-
bers 
Percent- 
age (%) 
1. Javanese 460,080 94,01 
2. Chinese 17,594 3,59 
3. Arabs 3,874 0,79 
4. Sundanese 1,940 0,40 
5. Banjarese 1,017 0,21 
6. Maduranese 968 0,20 
7. Batak 708 0,14 
8. Minang 290 0,06 
9. Others 2,949 0,60 
 TOTAL 489,420 100 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) 
branch of Surakarta 2000. 
 
 Although it is not quite clear 
when the Chinese came to the 
archipelago for the first time, it is 
obvious that its existence in Java is much 
earlier that the Dutch or even the Arabs. 
When the Dutch arrived at Batavia in the 
end of 16th century, traders from 
southern China were already well 
established in some port cities of Java 
(Purdey, 2006: 5). Similar to the presence 
of Arabs, the Chinese came to the 
archipelago for living due to the 
economic and political difficulties of 
their countries. Lombard (1996) asserts 
that in 18th century, Chinese assimilated 
broadly in Java. Further Carey (1984) 
notes that in 1704, the region of 
Pekalongan was granted to a big family 
of Chinese with the name of Jayaningrat. 
The growth population and the triumph 
of Chinese in business which 
endangered the existence of the Dutch’s 
business company (Vereenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) especially 
in Batavia led the massacre of about 
10,000 Chinese in 1740-1742. Some of the 
survived Chinese fled to Central Java 
(Lombard, 1996: 358).  
It was not until the Dutch 
occupation that this ethnic has problems 
with some indigenous people especially 
in Java. Prior to the coming of Dutch, the 
Chinese could immerse easily into any 
ethnics and communities In Indonesia, 
even to adopt some local cultures. Some 
scholars argue that among prominent 
wali (Islamic preachers in Java) are 
Chinese descendant such as Sunan 
Ampel, Sunan Bonang, Sunan Kudus, 
Sunan Kalijaga and Sunan Gunung Jati 
(Muljana 2005). The Dutch’s policy gave 
the Chinese higher social status than the 
Javanese especially during the Cultuur 
Stelsel (work force) in 1830-1870. The 
closeness of the Chinese to the Dutch 
government and royal families 
established an uneasy relationship with 
the Javanese. According to Cribb, it was 
not until 19th century that the Chinese 
have been becoming ‘problem’ for 
Indonesians when the Dutch 
government introduced and maintained 
a system of racial classification. It was in 
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1825, that the troops of Pangeran 
Diponegoro led by Ayu Yudakusumo 
killed a Chinese community in Ngawi 
which could be regarded as the first 
Javanese war toward Chinese in Java.9 
The prohibition of Pangeran Diponegoro 
for his followers to have (sex) interaction 
with Chinese women afterwards had 
seeded the hatred of Javanese toward 
Chinese. Unlike the Arabs, Carey even 
notes that the Chinese has no significant 
role in the struggle to achieve Indonesian 
independence (Carey 1986: 10).10  
Although after the Indonesian 
independence almost all Chinese were 
born in the country (peranakan), they still 
have problems to assimilate with the 
indigenous people. This uneasy 
relationship was supported by the fact 
that the New Order also neglected the 
existence of this ethnic within the 
diversity of the nation-state of Indonesia, 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). 
In the mid of 60s, the New Order regime 
introduced a series of laws and policies 
to repress expressions of Chinese 
identity and culture. The laws and 
policies forbade Chinese language and 
characters, and cultural festivals, while at 
the same time encouraged ethnic 
Chinese to adopt Indonesian-sounding 
names (Purdey, 2006: 21). Hence, the 
                                                 
9 Further on this issue, see Peter Carey, Changing 
Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities 
in Central Java, 1755-1825, in Indonesia, Vol. 37, 
1984. 
10 Since the birth of the proto-nationalism of 
Indonesia which was marked by the emergence of 
both national and Islamic organizations, the 
Chinese was never involved. Even more, the 
Chinese domination in batik business in Surakarta 
at that time invoked the rise of the Sarekat Islam 
(SI). While the Arabs were involved much in this 
“age of motion” in the forms of the Jami‘at al-Khair 
and also Al-Irshād for instance, no single Chinese 
organization arising in this category. Undeniably, 
therefore, that in 1928, the Chinese was excluded 
in the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Oath) for the 
hallmark of the Indonesian nationhood. Cf. Leo 
Suryadinata, Pribumi, Indonesians, the Chinese 
minority and China: A study of perceptions and 
policies, Marshall Cavendish Academic, Singapore, 
2005,pp. 9-11. 
central point of the Chinese problem in 
Indonesia is the social identity of the 
Chinese which never been regarded by 
other ethnics as part of 
Indonesian.11Currently, although 
Indonesian government has 
continuously revised the regulations on 
the peranakan, ethnic Chinese which 
make up 1.5 per cent of the Indonesian 
population still lack the same legitimacy 
as pribumi Indonesians. Regardless of the 
unfair treatment of the government 
toward ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, this 
ethnic has a strong nationalism on 
Indonesia. The willingness of this ethnic 
to learn local and national languages for 
instance is among their efforts to adopt 
their new identity. In many cases, 
Chinese living in Central Java for 
example speak Javanese more ‘totok’ than 
Javanese people, and so Chinese living in 
other regions. 
It is not quite clear either when 
the Chinese firstly came to Solo. 
However, it was quite obvious that this 
ethnic was already around when the 
Mataram kingdom moved from 
Kartasura to Sala in 1743 during the 
reign of Pakubuwono II (1745-174). The 
business interest of the Chinese always 
brought them to the centre of political 
institution. The ability of Chinese to 
adapt to new social changes and play in 
it made them could survive in any 
situation.12 Their successful in economics 
brought them to be closed to the elite 
politics of the Dutch government and 
Surakarta kingdom at that time. Due to 
the Dutch government’s policy, the 
population of the colony was divided 
into three categories: European, foreign 
Orientals, and native/inlander (Mandal, 
                                                 
11 Since the early of 19th century, the Chinese even 
proposed to Dutch government to have the same 
rights as European. The government refused it 
and finally issued the regulation which 
categorized Chinese as part of Foreign Orientals. 
12 Further see Ricklefs, M.C., Yogyakarta di Bawah 
Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792: Sejarah Pembagian 
Jawa, Matabangsa, Yogyakarta, 2002 
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1994: 55). The Chinese descendant which 
was initially part of inlanders was 
separated from them and thus later was 
separated from the category of 
“Indonesians”.13 Arabs and Chinese are 
in the second category which has also 
some privileges rather than the third 
category. Therefore, the most populous 
region of Chinese in Solo was at Balong 
and Warung Pelem which located at the 
northern side of the European vicinity. 
Therefore, Chinese which now are 
widely spread across Surakarta are 
coming from these two villages. Similar 
to any other regions in Indonesia, the 
Chinese in Solo has also been the pioneer 
in business. Since the Dutch era, the 
existence of the Chinese was significant 
for the kingdoms especially as the lender 
of money and advisor of the kingdoms’ 
trade (Carey, 1986: 11).14 In late of the 
19th century, Solo had become the centre 
of batik which had its market almost 
major cities in the archipelago at the 
time. On this business, the raw materials 
of batik were mostly under the control of 
the Chinese (Sariyatun & Hermanu: 40). 
 Obviously, the relationship 
between the Chinese and the Javanese in 
Solo was not quite good. Although the 
Chinese had a good relationship with the 
aristocrats, it is not with the common 
people of Javanese. Reportedly, there 
were also some Chinese converted to 
Islam in the early of the 20th century and 
even established Persatuan Islam Tionghoa 
(Chinese Muslims Union, PIT) in 1936. 
Rather than Arabs who tend to cooperate 
with the Javanese in business, the 
Chinese could be seen more as a rival of 
                                                 
13 Robert  Cribb, “Criminality, Violence and 
Chinese in the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1930-
1960.” Paper presented for International 
Conference ‘Decolonisasi and Posisi Etnis 
Tionghoa Indonesia 1930-1960. Padang, 18-21 
2006, p. 2. 
14 Carey even asserts that the Chinese was 
involved much in the kingdom’s matter especially 
during the reign of Pakubuwono IV (1788-1820) 
since he was so wastrel. See Carey, p. 18. 
business for Javanese. The emergence of 
the Sarekat Islam (SI) in 1912 in Laweyan 
was precisely as a reaction to the 
domination of the Chinese and also the 
VOC (Larson, 1979: 62). Indisputably, 
therefore, that the acculturation of the 
Chinese to the Javanese as the 
indigenous went so slowly. The ‘hatred’ 
of Javanese toward its business rival had 
given rise to the belief that the Chinese 
has older “awu” (spirit of descendant) 
rather than that of the Javanese.  
Therefore, although along with 
the reluctant of the Chinese to assimilate 
with the indigenous people, the Javanese 
reject this assimilation with the Chinese 
in term of marriage. Some Javanese 
believe that due to the ‘spirit’, the later 
descendents would have stronger 
Chinese characters rather than that of the 
Javanese. Although some Javanese may 
take the benefit from business 
relationship with the Chinese, the rivalry 
between these two ethnics remains at the 
bottom of social structure of the 
Solonese. In addition, the triumph of the 
Chinese in business in general to some 
extent has positioned it as different social 
class. All above privileges, social status, 
residential situation and opportunities or 
political access have led to such kind of 
social gap between Chinese in the one 
hand and Javanese on the other. The 
nowadays success of Chinese in business 
is another social jealousy which add 
another social gap with the lower level 
Javanese.  
Along with the half-hearted 
process of indigenization, religion has 
become major difference between the 
Chinese and the Javanese. Culturally the 
Chinese’s culture has been curb by the 
New Order regime15 and, hence, it has 
                                                 
15 Lombard asserts that Chinese in Java had 
adopted much of Javanese traditions since prior 
the occupation of the Dutch in Indonesian 
archipelago. The Chinese ethnic leading in 
business brought it to such of special status 
among the Javanese. This phenomenon was 
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adopted much of the Javanese’s such the 
language of Javanese. Besides, the 
Chinese has also been forced not to show 
up its cultural traditions such as the 
Chinese New Year and other celebration 
days. However, since religion has been 
playing significant role in Javanese 
society, this distinction has given rise to 
such kind of tension between them. Most 
of ethnic Chinese’s religions are 
Confucianism and Christianity, while the 
Javanese’s are Islam and Javanese 
syncretism. The religious differences 
between the Chinese and Javanese was 
the major obstacle of the first parts’ 
indigenization. In many cases in 
Indonesia, furthermore, religious 
difference has been considered to see 
other adherent of religion as ‘otherness’. 
Although many Chinese have adopted 
some Javanese culture such as in naming 
of their offspring, religion is still the 
main hindrance of inter-marriage 
between the Chinese and indigenous 
people.  
It should be noted here, however, 
that many Javanese especially residing at 
Balong and Warung Pelem could take 
the advantages of the Chinese triumph in 
business. Therefore, since the 
relationship between these two ethnics in 
the villages in quite good, the Chinese in 
these villages is never became the 
victims of riots in Solo. In fact, the above 
case could be a good sample for other 
residents in Solo in term of their 
relationship. Indeed, it seems on the 
surface that the relationship between 
Chinese and the indigenous people in 
general in Solo is good. I believe, 
however, that cultural and religious 
                                                                    
marked by the belief among the Javanese that the 
blood of a murdered-Chinese is doubled 
compared to that of a Javanese. The presence of 
Dutch in Batavia in 1619 twisted the assimilation 
process of the Chinese ethnic in Java particularly 
and in the archipelago in general. On this issue 
see, Dennys Lombard, Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya. 
Kajian Sejarah Terpadu Bagian II: Jaringan Asian. 
Jakarta:Gramedia, 1996, p. 357.  
differences among them have given rise 
to different cultural identity. In fact, 
historically there were many Chinese in 
Solo who adopted Javanese culture as 
part of their traditions.16 The 
insignificant number of the Chinese who 
did so which could not unite their 
identity. The absence of common identity 
among them is a hindrance to the unity 
among them. Therefore, as long as this 
main problem is not resolved, 
indigenization and identity would 
always be problems lying beneath the 
communities in Solo.  
 
2. Social and economic deprivation: the 
seeds of fragmentation 
Social fragmentation is among the factors 
behind the rise of radical Islamism in 
Solo. Since the beginning of the Solonese 
history, the lower level abangan Javanese 
majority of the Solonese have been 
deprived socially and in economics. The 
social stratification during the Dutch 
occupation had put the abangan Javanese 
into the lowest level after the Dutch and 
Javanese priyayi (high level class) at the 
top level, while Arabs and Chinese on 
the second level.17 This privilege of the 
Dutch gave also possibilities not only for 
Chinese to live at urban areas, but also 
other business conveniences. Eventually, 
the lower level abangan Javanese were 
marginalized not only socially, but also 
in economics. Such social and economic 
situation did not change significantly 
until recently. Although many of the 
lower level Javanese today are living at 
                                                 
16 Rustopo notes that there were several cultural 
institutions founded and run by Chinese in Solo 
especially during the Old Order period such as 
Wayang Orang Panggung (Human Puppet on the 
Stage, WOP). There were also some Chinese 
involved in the Perkumpulan Masyarakat Surakarta 
(The Association of Surakarta Society, PMS) 
especially on the department of art. Further on 
this issue, see Rustopo, Menjadi Jawa: Orang-orang 
Tionghoa dan kebudayaan Jawa di Surakarta, 1895-
1998, Penerbit Ombak, Yogyakarta, 2007. 
17 On the account of Arabs in Java see Mandal, 
Finding Their Place.  
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the periphery of urban areas, they are 
constantly marginalized economically. 
Current success of Chinese in business is 
another social jealousy which add 
another social gap with the lower level 
Javanese. In turn, recurring anti-Chinese 
riot has became long-lasting crucial issue 
in Solo. Interestingly enough, most riots 
caused by any social problems would 
finally lead to the destruction of Chinese 
properties.18 
 The legacy of Dutch’s law to 
regulate society according to their social 
status sustains social deprivation. 
Furthermore, the regulation of 
Kasunanan kingdom during the Dutch 
occupation to arrange society according 
to their social status also positioned the 
lower level Javanese into the periphery 
of the city. This situation was not only 
deprived the lower level Javanese 
socially, but it also led them to have 
limited access to economic resources. 
Along with the modernization process of 
Indonesia, Solo is also developing well in 
many aspects economically. Similar to 
other big cities in Indonesia in general, 
the economic development in Solo is also 
followed by demographic changes 
especially the movement of suburb 
people to urban areas. Job opportunities, 
however, do not provide enough space 
for the new dwellers coming for their 
living. As a result, the more people live 
in the slum areas of Solo, the more 
unemployed youth living in the areas. 
This social situation is worsened by the 
economic crisis hit Southeast Asian 
countries, and even monetary crisis of 
Indonesia. This socio-economic situation 
has given rise to the emergence unstable 
society.  
 In addition to the social 
deprivation, the surpassing of Chinese in 
                                                 
18 On this issue, see Jemma Purdey “The 'other' 
May riots: anti-Chinese violence in Solo, May 
1998” in Charles A. Coppel, Violent conflicts in 
Indonesia: analysis, representation, resolution, 
Routledge, New York, 2006. 
business also has deprived the lower 
level Javanese economically. Along the 
history of Solo, ethnic Chinese plays a 
significant role in major business in the 
region. In the early 1990s, although 
Chinese population was only about 4.4 
per cent (24,000) of the total population 
of the city, about 80 per cent of shop 
owner in Solo were Chinese (Purdey, 
2006: 126). The domination of Chinese in 
business is considered by Javanese as 
their main rival. Undeniably, therefore, 
many people believe that Chinese behind 
the sudden disappearance of certain 
products from the market. On the other 
hand, the failure of the government to 
overcome Indonesian’s economic crisis 
and to distribute welfare to society has 
worsened socio-economic condition. 
Therefore, it is obvious that social gap 
between the poor and the wealthy is 
represented by the Javanese and the 
Chinese respectively. In many cases, the 
Javanese actions could be seen as class 
actions, i.e., proletariat against the 
bourgeois. Since the bourgeois is 
represented by Chinese, this ethnic 
become the ‘victims’ of many proletariat 
Javanese actions.  
Social gap based on ethnicity is a 
big challenge of the Javanese in Solo. The 
social disparities has become vulnerable 
factors behind the phenomenon of social 
radicalism in the city. Therefore, anti-
Chinese riots is the long-lasting crucial 
issue in Solo. Interestingly enough, most 
riots triggered by any trivial social 
problems would finally lead to the 
destruction of Chinese properties. Hence, 
along the history of Solo, the issue of 
religion has become the most critical 
issue which could lead to social violence. 
In other words, religious sentiment has 
strengthened the break down of the 
Solonese social structure. The recurring 
social riots in Solo is due partly to the 
failure of the government as well as 
social thinkers to create such a melting 
pot for the diverse ethnics. The 
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difficulties and inability of ethnics 
especially Chinese to immerse to the 
Javanese society is one of the reason of 
the disparity between Chinese and 
Javanese. However, different religion 
and culture prohibit them to interact 
each other more than just in business 
matters. 
 
3. Political deprivation: the 
fragmentation of political authorities 
Along with the above characteristic of 
the Solonese, political deprivation also 
played a significant role in the 
fragmentation of the society. Since the 
early history of Solo under the rule of 
Kasunanan kingdom, the rulers had 
neglected the grassroots due to political 
matters. History records that the patron-
client system was not maintained well 
especially during the Dutch occupation. 
The fact that religious leaders do not 
play a significant role in Solo is also 
supported by the reality that neither 
traditional nor modern Solo leaders do 
pay enough attentions to the society. 
Finally, the political deprivation has 
given to the destruction of social system. 
The emergence of such radical Islamic 
groups as Sarekat Islam or current 
vigilante forces is only a symptom of this 
fragmentation.  
 The absence of such social 
cohesion among the Solonese is also 
another major factor to the social 
fragmentation. The hegemonic power of 
the Solo kingdoms during the Dutch 
occupation is another deprivation of the 
lower level Javanese abangan. The 
aristocrats of the Kasunanan and 
Mangkunegaran kingdoms did not play 
a significant role in the society. Since the 
very beginning of the history of Solo 
(Surakarta) in the 18th century, politics 
was becoming a dominant issues among 
the aristocrats which finally split the 
Mataram kingdom into several 
kingdoms. The inability of the aristocrats 
to handle social problems properly had 
drawn the involvement of Dutch 
business company (VOC) in both 
internally or externally social problems. 
The rise of the Sarekat Islam in the early 
20th century as the peak of social protest 
to the hegemony of the authoritarian 
Dutch government was not responded 
positively by the aristocrats. This 
ignorance was also supported by the 
disharmonic relationship between the 
Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran 
kingdoms which is lasting until recently. 
The Kasunanan kingdom which was 
relatively closer to society finally did not 
care much to what really happened in 
the society. On the other hand, the social 
gap or distance between the aristocrats 
and kawula19 (lower class people) was not 
well mediated by the priyayi (upper class 
people). On the emergence of the Sarekat 
Islam, Kuntowijoyo asserts that it was as 
a result of collectively sub-conscious 
culture due to the failure of the priyayis 
mediate between raja and kawula.  
Until the independence of 
Indonesia in 1945, the kingdoms let alone 
Kasunanan reluctantly acknowledged 
the new state and still accepted the 
return of Dutch government in 1948. The 
detachment of the Kasunanan to the 
lower class people was responded by the 
reluctant of the people to the planning of 
Indonesian government to give the 
Kasunanan a special autonomous region 
in 1946.20 The social actions in the name 
                                                 
19 For the case of social class during that time, I 
tend to employ Kuntowijoyo’s category: raja-
priyayi-kawulo (king-upper class-lower class). 
Further on this account, see on his work Raja, 
Priyayi & Kawulo: Surakarta 1900-1915, Penerbit 
Ombak, Yogyakarta, 2004, p. 9. 
20 On August 1945, the Pakubuwono XII who just 
inaugurated as the king of the Kasunanan 
kingdom was selected as the leader of the Komite 
Nasional Indonesia Daerah (Regional Indonesian 
National Committee, KNID) as part of the effort of 
the Republic of Indonesia to compose government 
of the regional level (swa-praja). Some people 
considered this appointment as an effort of the 
Indonesian government to re-empower the 
kingdom. They kidnapped some prominent 
figures of the kingdom and demanded (1) the 
omission of the swa-praja region of Surakarta, (2) 
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of anti-Swapraja (anti-autonomous 
government) were supported by 
majority of the Solonese.21 Obviously, the 
failure of the kingdoms to be such kind 
of social cohesion for the society, to some 
extend, have split the unity of the 
society. Nowadays, the traditional 
leaders or kings of Kasunanan and 
Mangkunegaran kingdom do not have 
any significant power in society. Politics 
and power within the Kasunanan 
kingdom is much more interesting for 
the rulers rather than caring society. Due 
to disharmonic relationship among the 
princess of the Kasunanan (the children 
of Pakubuwono XII), currently there are 
two kings, Hangabehi and Tedjowulan , 
who declare that each of them is the most 
authoritative as the king of Kasunanan 
entitled as Pakubuwono XIII. In 
addition, both kings are trying to regain 
the king’s recognition from society by 
exhibiting some kingdom’s cultural 
heritage to public and giving certain 
people kingdoms’ titles.22 Regardless of 
the enthusiastic of some people about 
these events, many consider all these 
activities as cultural and historical events 
rather than to acknowledge the authority 
of kingdom. Unlike the power of 
                                                                    
the resignation of Pakubuwono XII, and (3) 
changing of some rules of swa-praja which is not 
suitable with modern era. Further on this issue, 
see Bram Setiaji (et al), Raja di Alam Republik: 
keraton Kasunanan Surakarta dan Pakubuwono XII, 
PT Bina Rena Pariwara, Jakarta , 2000, pp. 88-90. 
Apart of the refusal of the autonomous region, 
some unrecognized people kidnapped the prime 
minister Syahrir when he visited Solo on June 
1946.On this issue see, Soejatno, Revolution and 
social tensions in Surakarta 195-1950 in Indonesia, 
No. 17  (April), Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 
1974, pp. 104-105. 
21 Further on this account, see Noto Soeroto, Pro 
Swapraja, Mataram, Solo, 1950, pp. 24-25. 
Soedarmono and Muh. Amin, Solusi Konflik 
Pribumi dan non-Pribumi di Kota Solo. Laporan 
Penelitian Dosen Muda at UNS, 2002, p. 1. 
22 Tempo, 06 September 2004 on 
www.tempointeraktif.com (Accessed 20 
September 2007); Seputar Indonesia, 03 September 
2007. 
traditional leaders in Solo, the king of 
Kasultanan Yogyakarta has more 
authoritative and much more powerful 
among the people of Yogyakarta. 
Historically, since the beginning of the 
history of Kasultanan Yogyakarta, the 
elites of the kingdom are closed to the 
grassroots. 
The authoritarian government of 
the New Order worsened the political 
deprivation of the society. The political 
attitude of Suharto regime was felt by 
almost all communities in Indonesia at 
the time, yet it was much worse in the 
context of Solo since the Solonese have 
long history being deprived politically. 
The single majority of Golongan Karya 
(Functional Group, Golkar) had deprived 
any political aspirations of society 
especially that against the government. 
The phenomenon of the Mega Bintang of 
Mudrick M. Sangidoe in 1997 clearly 
signed the enormous opposition of the 
society against the hegemonic power of 
the New Order. In fact, the phenomenon 
of Sarekat Islam in 1912 is similar to the 
phenomenon of Mega-Bintang. The 
longing of the Solonese to the 
government caring much of its society 
resulted the emergence of such social 
radicalism. Undeniably, therefore, that 
on the reformation era, the PDI-P which 
rooted at the grassroots gains its 
enormous voters in Solo. Current 
political elites which satisfied the 
necessity of lower level abangan Javanese 
which hopefully could reduce radicalism 
in the region. 
 
C. Political Impacts of the Social Facts 
for Radical Islam in Solo 
Political and social climate of the post-
New Order era have given rise of some 
Islamic activisms. Many groups of 
Muslims responded differently to the 
opportunity. In general, however, in 
more open political atmosphere the 
demand of more formalistic Islam would 
surface since conservative Muslim 
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groups would have more mass supports 
and political resources. In the national 
context, there are at least three features 
appeared in such scene, (1) the 
establishment of a number of Islamic 
political parties that mostly adopted 
Islam as their basis instead of  the 
Pancasila, (2) the increasing demand of 
implementation of sharī‘ah in some parts 
of Indonesia, and (3) the emergence of 
some Islamic vigilante forces such as 
Lasykar Jihad (Jihadi Troops), Front 
Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defender 
Front). Along with the emergence of 
radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, the 
city of Solo also witness the 
distinctiveness of radical Islamists in the 
region. 
 The dramatic changes from the 
New Order to the Reformation Era have 
changed political system of the state. 
Although there is no exactly similar 
practice of democracy in the world, the 
democracy of Pancasila adopted by the 
New Order regime was flawed and ill-
described. In the name of ‘democracy’, 
the state did not give much opportunity 
for society to actively participate in 
governing the state. In fact, the 
democracy during the Suharto regime 
was much alike with that of during the 
Sukarno era, the guided democracy 
(demokrasi terpimpin), which is pseudo-
democracy. Obviously, the 
democratization process of Indonesia is 
meant to compose an imagined nation or 
nation-of-intent. Since the practice of 
democracy during both the Old and New 
Order could not accommodate all stake 
holders of the nations, many people felt 
that their existence was not really 
recognize by the state. Therefore, the 
nationhood of Indonesia is not a finished 
process yet. 
Many groups of people 
disappointed with the nation- state of 
Indonesia protested in many various 
ways. The government, however, limited 
only for certain groups of people to have 
access to politics. Muslims who had been 
curbed during the Sukarno regime were 
also suppressed during the first 25 years 
of the Suharto regime. Undeniably, there 
were many conflicts between Islam and 
the state during this period which 
brought about the marginalization of 
Islam.23 To support the authoritarian 
state, Suharto gave certain limited people 
access to the natural resources of the 
state. The current complicated and vast 
corruptions among the elite politicians 
are among the way how Suharto 
establishes his ‘kingdom’. It was such 
behaviour which gave rise to the 
emergence of resistance movements 
among the society. Horizontal conflicts 
in the form of ethnic or religious conflicts 
were happened as part of the process of 
democratization of Indonesia. Several 
structural conflicts were also occurred as 
part of their disappointment with the 
government which could not share some 
natural resources equally with local 
governments or traditional leaders. 
Apparently, it takes long time and 
painful prior to the birth of a new 
democracy a la Indonesia.  
The current democratization 
process of Indonesia has opened many 
possibilities. Undeniably, the decline of 
Suharto was worsened by the monetary 
crisis of Southeast Asia. The inability of 
the government to overcome the crisis 
which hit almost the entire society of 
Indonesia has also worsened the 
legitimacy of the state among its citizens. 
Along with social and religious conflicts, 
there are also some groups of people 
demanding the inclusion of Islam on the 
governmental level such as the sharī‘ah 
‘fever’ in various parts of Indonesia. On 
the parliament, there was vicious debate 
about the necessity of applying the 
Pancasila as stated in the Jakarta Charter. 
The long debate finally did not resolve 
the problem. The economic problems 
and longing of society to such a good 
                                                 
23 Further on this issue, see Bachtiar Effendy, Islam 
and the Sate in Indonesia, ISEAS, Singapore, 2003. 
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governance attracted more groups of 
people to participate in forming better 
governmental system. Not only are 
many uneducated people involved in 
politics, there are also many religious 
leaders on the elite politics. Social and 
political problems finally led to the 
polarization of the society. The 
inexistence of such a melting pot among 
the society has worsened the situation, 
beside also the absence of social and 
religious leaders as an adhesive for the 
unity of the society. The emergence of 
Laskar Jihād and Front Pembela Islam in the 
beginning of the Reformation Era signed 
the inability of the government to 
overcome the socio-political problems of 
the country. 
 In the context of Solo, the 
disappointment of the society toward the 
state has been reflected by many various 
forms. In general, however, such 
complicated socio-political situation has 
given rise to the emergence of social 
radicalism. Among the social radicalism 
in the region is the emergence of many 
various forms of radical Islamism. In 
fact, some Islamists have already around 
since the early of the New Order regime 
and to some extent had shown their 
radical activities. During the 
conduciveness of political system of the 
Reformation Era, some Islamists emerge 
as a protest toward the state and also to 
participate in the reconstruction of the 
nationhood of Indonesia. Some people 
view that Islam is not merely as religion 
but is also as a way of life including 
politics. Along with the socio-economic 
problems faced by lower level people, 
Islam is giving many promises which 
would lead them to a better life.  
Different from other regions 
which currently already adopted sharī‘ah 
as regional regulation (perda sharī‘ah), 
the Solonese Muslims articulate their 
views on Islam distinctively. At least 
there are two features of the 
distinctiveness of the Solonese Muslims 
which obviously could be categorized as 
radical Islamism, i.e., (1) the emergence 
of many various Islamic vigilante forces, 
and (2) the emergence of new publishers 
on Islamic activism. Unlike the 
emergence of vigilante forces in other 
regions across Indonesia, there are at 
least 10 Islamic vigilante forces have 
emerged in the region. There are (1) 
Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (the 
Surakarta Youth Muslim fRONT, FPIS), 
(2) Laskar Hizbullah Sunan Bonang (the 
party of Allah soldier of Sunan Bonang), 
(3) Laskar Jundullah (the soldier of Allah), 
(4) Hawariyyun (the disciples), (5) Brigade 
Hizbullah (the party of Allah Brigade), (6) 
Barisan Bismillah (the Path of Bismillah), 
(7) Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta (the 
soldier of Surakarta Muslim, LUIS), (8) 
Al-Ishlah (the reform), (9) Gerakan Pemuda 
Ka’bah (the Ka’bah Youth Movement, 
GPK), and (10) Front Pembela Islam (the 
front of Islamic defender, FPI). Although 
the last two vigilante forces are only the 
branches of those in Jakarta, the 
existence of eight other vigilante forces 
in Solo is a significant phenomenon of 
radical Islamism in the region. 
Obviously, the above list does not 
include the Jama‘ah Islamiyah (JI) since it 
is a national phenomenon although Solo 
is central for the clandestine 
organization. 
 Another feature of the rise of 
radical Islamism in the region is also 
characterised by the emergence of some 
publishers on Islamic activism. In many 
respects, Solo is just after Jakarta in term 
of its publishers on Islamism; various 
current publications on Islamic activism 
are mostly published either in Jakarta or 
Solo. Out of other publishers on common 
teachings of Islam, there are at least nine 
publishers on conservative Islamism 
including Islamic activism. There are (1) 
Pustaka Al-‘Alaq, (2) Jazeera, (3) Era 
Intermedia, (4) Media Insani Press, (5) 
Pustaka Mantiq, (6) Arofah, (7) Aulia 
Press, (8) At-Tibyan and (9) An-Nadwah. 
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While the Pustaka Al-‘Alaq publishes a 
series book on jihād of Abdullah Azzam, 
the second publisher Jazeera is famous 
because it publishes the book of Imam 
Samudera, Aku Melawan Teroris. In 
addition, it is also significant to add in 
this category that there are also several 
small companies producing cassettes and 
compact disk (CDs) on radical Islamism 
such as cassettes on the preaching of 
Abdullah Sungkars and CDs on 
Afghanistan and Maluku/Ambon 
battles. 
 In addition, it is also worthwhile 
to note that while Ikhwani activisms is 
flourishing among highly educated 
people in Solo such as university 
students, salafy pietism is also flourishing 
among less educated people. In the one 
hand, the first characteristic is common 
phenomenon in many cities in Indonesia 
such as the abundant followers Kesatuan 
Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (United 
Action of Indonesian Muslim Students, 
KAMMI) as the underbow of Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperity and Justice 
Party) and also well accepted of Hizbut 
Tahrīr Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party 
of Liberation, HTI) in many various 
universities in Indonesia. On the other 
hand, salafy pietism is broadly accepted 
among less educated and lower class 
people such as those of the Pondok 
Ngruki and jama‘ah Gumuk. However, 
the salafism of both institutions is 
different from other salafy school in the 
region. While some others tend to be 
purist salafy, the Pondok Ngruki and 
jama‘ah Gumuk is salafy in term of its 
ideology.  
 Finally, it is difficult to conclude 
that either of Islamic activisms, the 
Pondok Ngruki and jama‘ah Gumuk, is 
better than another. In fact, they are 
different in many respects since they are 
different type of Islamic activism. 
Although they could be categorized as 
salafy, their salafism is different each other 
which also different from the 
mainstreaming salafy in Indonesia in 
general. As radical Islamism, however, 
both could be said as successful radical 
Islamism. While the Pondok Ngruki 
could influence and attract abangans at its 
surrounding until it formed such an 
‘enclave’, the jama‘ah Gumuk is 
successful in term of attracting abangan 
people to join to the exclusive Islamic 
teachings and also the FPIS as well as the 
Hawariyyūn. Conclusively, although they 
have some differences, they have many 
things in common as radical Islamism.   
 
D. Concluding Remark 
Obviously, the nation-state of Indonesia 
is on trial. Although Indonesia has 
achieved its independence since about 60 
years ago, the notion of nationhood of 
Indonesia is not finished yet. Rebellious 
conflicts in several parts of Indonesia 
apparently do not only split the unity of 
Indonesia, but also left the question on 
the nationhood of Indonesia. In fact, 
there are some groups of people 
dissatisfied with the nation-state of 
Indonesia especially due to economic 
matters. Compared to some of its 
counterparts in Southeast Asia, 
Indonesia is left in many aspects in 
economics. Such this disappointment, 
finally, led to the eagerness of some 
groups of people to change the national 
identity. The classical problem such as 
the Jakarta Charter and the Pancasila as 
the state’s ideological foundation 
resurfaced. Along with the split of East 
Timor from Indonesian and also some 
other potential conflicts’ regions such as 
Aceh and Papua, some Islamists demand 
sharī‘ah as the positive law. Some 
Islamists view that sharī‘ah is the ultimate 
solution for current endless social and 
political problems of Indonesia.  
 The inability of the government 
to deal with current socio-political 
problems is due to the complexity of the 
problems. The problems do not only lie 
on the political level but also within the 
society. It is the problems on the political 
level which finally led to the difficulties 
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of the government to deal with korupsi, 
kolusi and nepotisme (corruption, 
collusion and nepotism, KKN). It was the 
tough pressure of the New Order 
government toward Muslims which have 
given rise to the breakdown of social 
structure of the society. For such 
patriarchal society as Indonesian 
especially Javanese, the legacy of 
traditional social status or social 
hierarchy is necessary to maintain the 
social system within the society. 
Therefore, the existence of religious and 
traditional leaders is absolutely needed 
for Indonesian society especially to 
interpret new and modern values into 
the society. In the context of Reformation 
Era, such cultural brokers as traditional 
leaders and ulamas are needed to sustain 
social exchange within the society. 
Otherwise, in the era which permit any 
possibilities, people would loose their 
control and do whatever they want as a 
political euphoria.  
 Obviously, the government is 
powerless to handle the complex 
problems faced by Indonesia. The 
disappointment of society toward the 
government has brought about their 
distrust toward the government. The 
disappointment finally led to 
questioning on the nationhood of 
Indonesia and the possibility of another 
identity to overcome the problems. In 
addition, the weak of the government is 
deteriorated by its powerless to impose 
some positive laws into the society. 
Endless monetary crisis hit Southeast 
Asia and Indonesian in particular 
deteriorate the legitimacy of the 
government among society. All the 
above have given rise to the breakdown 
of some laws among the society. In the 
context of Solo and also some other cities 
generally, the most obvious breaking of 
law is the disobedience of some cafés 
and restaurants to be closed down 
during the fasting month (ramadhan). 
This situation was worsened by the 
disability of the government to deal with 
religious conflicts such as in Ambon and 
Maluku.  
 All the above forced some groups 
of people to be involve in dealing with 
the problems by conducting street 
politics as an alternative. The 
establishment of many vigilante forces is 
chosen by some groups of people as the 
most suitable solution to address the 
problems. With this power, these groups 
of people conducting demonstrations in 
the street protesting government’s 
policies and raiding cafés, hotels and 
other entertainment places as done by 
the FPI in Jakarta and the FPIS in Solo. 
Even more, several vigilante forces in 
Solo conducted ‘sweeping’ of Westerners 
in the city. The ‘sweeping’ was 
conducted as their attempt to protest the 
interference of US to Indonesia’s politics 
and also the invasion of US to Iraq in 
2002. In many cases, some vigilante 
forces even cooperated with the 
authorities to conduct raids etc. Some 
leaders of the vigilante forces argue that 
their attitude is to impose the realization 
of some regional regulation (peraturan 
daerah, perda) such as on drunken 
beverages (minuman keras). In general, 
they see that their attitude is still on the 
ordinary manner since they do not use 
violence as their attitude.  
 Besides, these groups see the 
necessity of another social system which 
could be an ultimate solution for their 
problems. They see Islam as a 
comprehensive religion which does not 
only regulate worship to Allah but also 
as a social system. Along with the Majelis 
Islam Indonesia (MMI), some of the 
vigilante forces also utterly summon the 
necessity of sharī‘ah and jihād in order to 
compose ummah (Muslim society). 
Currently, the notion of sharī‘ah is 
accepted well among the society rather 
than the concept of negara Islam (Islamic 
State) which were did not responded 
positively among the society. Although 
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at its minimum fashion, each of these 
groups are trying to impose sharī‘ah 
among their own limited group or 
enclave. By reinforcing sharī‘ah, they are 
trying to alter national identity to be 
more religious. Each of these radical 
Islamic organization, however, has its 
own way to implement sharī‘ah. In the 
context of Solo, however, Abu Bakar 
Ba'asyir’s demand on the regional 
regulation (perda) based on sharī‘ah, for 
example, was not responded positively 
by many other Islamic organizations in 
Solo. The jama‘ah Gumuk see that it is not 
the precise time to impose sharī‘ah since 
the society is not ready yet. It fears that 
the notion of sharī‘ah would even rejected 
by Muslim communities, even more the 
Khilafah Islamiyah which still burred 
among radical Islamists. 
 The emergence of some radical 
Islamic organizations, however, is not 
inline with the acceptance of the 
Solonese of the notion of sharī‘ah. In fact, 
the phenomenon of abundant vigilante 
forces and the acceptance of Pondok 
Ngruki among abangan is only trivial 
phenomenon and not mainstreaming yet 
among abangan Solonese. In other words, 
the limited acceptance of the notion of 
Islamism among the Solonese is due 
mostly to the inability of some leaders of 
Islamism to frame the current social 
problems. Unlike the Sarekat Islam (SI) in 
the early 20th century which was 
mainstreaming in the society, the notion 
of sharī‘ah is only accepted among certain 
levels of abangan communities. In this 
regard, I tend to say that the propaganda 
of Islamists does not touch the heart 
problems of the society yet. Undeniably, 
therefore that although there are many 
radical Islamic organizations in Solo, the 
demand on the perda sharī‘ah is not 
responded positively by the Solonese 
Muslims. In addition, this occurance is 
also due partly to the various colour of 
Islam in the region. Although such 
radical Islamic vigilante forces are 
abundant in Solo, there are several other 
powerful Islamic organizations such as 
the MTA which has enormous members 
in Solo in particular and the ex-residency 
of Surakarta in general. 
 On the emergence of many 
Islamic vigilante forces in Solo, I tend to 
say that it has to do with the habitus of 
the Solonese. While the socio-political 
deprivation on the Solonese is the habitus 
and historical precedence is the capital, 
the political conduciveness in the field on 
Bourdieu’s theory of habitus. Since the 
early history of Solo, such radical 
response of Muslims toward socio-
political problem is becoming part of the 
Solonese culture. The emergence of the 
vigilante forces of the Tentara Kanjeng 
Nabi Muhammad (Army of the Lord 
Prophet Muhammad, TKNM) and Sidiq 
Tabligh Amanah and Vatonah (to confirm, 
convey, and propagate goodness, SATV) 
during the early of the 20th century was 
such a precedence for the Solonese 
Muslims to response any violating issues 
on Islam.  Radical responses of the 
Solonese to the autonomous government 
during the early of the Old Order period 
was also part of the habitus of  the 
Solonese. In general, I would argue that 
radical activism either violence or not 
has become part of the habitus of the 
Solonese. The radical responses of the 
Solonese toward the dramatic changes of 
the political system in 1998 were among 
the phenomenon of this habitus. 
 Finally, I would argue that the 
emergence of such radical Islamism in 
Solo is due mostly to the failure 
relationship between santri and abangan. 
It is obvious that most radical Islamic 
activisms are well-accepted among lower 
level abangan, although this trend is not 
mainstreaming. The indifference of the 
Solonese Muslims to the regional 
regulation (perda) of sharī‘ah and 
Islamism in general sign that there are 
various levels of abangan in the region. 
At least there are two kinds of abangan in 
the region, i.e., those attached to 
Javanese syncretism and those attached 
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to communism. For those attached to 
Javanese syncretism, it is easier for them 
to convert to be Islamists, while those 
previously communists tend to convert 
to Christianity as their religion for their 
own safety. Meanwhile, the Solonese 
Muslims who were previously on the 
category of santri nowadays could accept 
modernity easily. The widely spread of 
radical Islamism in the region is due 
mostly to the failure of santri to involve 
abangan in their mainstream. Finally, it is 
difficult to say which school of Islam is 
mainstreaming in the region since all 
schools of Islam, traditional, moderate 
and conservative has its own vast 
communities in the region.  
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